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REGULATION OF INDECENCY IN POLITICAL 
BROADCASTING 
The First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of 
the press have long been in tension with the public's right to be 
free from invasions of privacy. Nowhere has the tens'ion been 
sharper in recent years than in the area of governmental interven-
tion into the affairs of the broadcast media. Indecency in political 
broadcasting is one situation in particular in which these values 
are likely to come into conflict. This article examines this situa-
tion; specifically, it considers whether the government can pro-
scribe "indecent" political commercials and broadcasts. 
Two recent legal disputes highlight the problem. In FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation, 1 the Supreme Court upheld Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) sanctions against a radio station 
for an "indecent" broadcast of words which the Commission 
found to be sexually offensive. In so holding, the Court reaffirmed 
the government's authority to regulate the broadcast media. 
The problem of regulation of indecency in political broadcast-
ing arose again during the 1978 gubernatorial primary in Georgia. 
J.B. Stoner, a candidate for the Democratic nomination, spon-
sored a series of television commercials which included the asser-
tion that "[i]f Busbee [Stoner's opponent] is re-elected, he will 
pass more civil rights that take from the whites and give to the 
niggers." Responding to a complaint filed by Julian Bond, a well-
known black politician, the FCC determined that it could not 
restrict such broadcasts.2.Bond compared Stoner's use of the word 
"nigger" to the indecency which was broadcast in Pacifica. The 
FCC rejected his claim, noting that the Supreme Court limited 
the application of the statutory prohibition in Pacifica to sexual 
or excretory "indecency. " 3 
This article focuses on two situations in which the First 
1 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The Supreme Court upheld the imposition of a $100 fine against 
a New York radio station, WBAI, for a midaftemoon broadcast of a comedy routine 
written and performed by George Carlin which featured a number of "profane" words. The 
routine, entitled "Filthy Words," concerned society's attitude toward certain words, par-
ticularly those highlighted in the monologue. (For a transcript of the monologue, see 438 
U.S. at 751-55). After receiving a complaint from one listener, the FCC determined that 
the broadcast violated the ban on indecent language imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976). 
1 Julian Bond, 69 F.C.C. 2d 943 (1978). 
1 Id. at 944. 
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Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press 
may conflict with the countervailing right of the public to be free 
from exposure to certain types of speech: first, the government's 
ability to extend its prohibition against indecency to offensive 
speech not currently prohibited, such as that used by Stoner; 
second, the use of "indecent" language, as defined in Pacifica, by 
a political candidate. 
The article considers both the constitutional and statutory as-
pects of the regulation of indecency in political broadcasting. The 
discussion is limited to considering "indecency," a term exclud-
ing obscenity or incitement to violence, because the government's 
power to regulate these types of speech is well established. 4 Inde-
cent speech would be protected if used in the print media, since 
it does not fall within the established First Amendment excep-
tions. 5 The basic constitutional question, therefore, is whether the 
broadcast media are inherently different from the print media, so 
as to justify different treatment of indecent political speech. This 
article will contend that they are not inherently different. 
In the constitutional analysis, both sexual and non-sexual 
forms of indecency will be considered. The Supreme Court has, 
thus far, defined the prohibited statutory indecency to include 
only excretory and sexual language.8 This standard is not consti-
tutionally mandated. The contention underlying Bond's com-
plaint is that non-sexual offensiveness should also be subject to 
regulation by the government. Whatever legitimate state inter-
ests are furthered by the prohibition of sexual indecency may also 
be served by the broader regulation of other offensive speech. 7 
The article contends that, in determining what forms of speech 
may be regulated as "indecent," it is improper summarily to 
exclude non-sexual speech as the FCC has done. 
The second aspect of the problem concerns statutory interpre-
tation. If it is constitutionally permissible to regulate indecent 
political speech, do the applicable statutes authorize such 
interference? Certain federal statutes prohibit the broadcast of 
indecent speech, while others prohibit censorship by the FCC and 
broadcasting stations. In resolving this conflict, this article con-
cludes that indecent political speech is generally not within the 
reach of the statutes banning indecency. 
' See notes 22-41 and accompanying text infra. 
• See Part IAl infra. 
• Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739. 
1 See notes 147-49 and accompanying text infra. 
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A. Regulating Indecency 
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The governmental interest asserted in regulation is the need to 
protect the public from unwanted, indecent speech. This claim 
requires an examination of the scope of indecency and the justifi-
cations for its suppression. 
1. Relation to unprotected speech-Some speech is so offen-
sive to society that it is absolutely unprotected. 8 This category of 
speech-obscenity-is limited strictly to "works which, taken as 
a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex [as determined by 
the application of contemporary community standards], which 
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, 
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value."9 Since obscenity does not have constitutional 
protection, it is subject to full regulation within the context of the 
broadcast media, 10 as well as within the contexts of other media. 
The only indecency standard adopted by the Supreme Court 
proscribes offensive references to "excretory or sexual activities or 
organs."11 This standard, based on offensiveness and application 
to sexual references, indicates that indecency, at least as it is 
understood by the FCC in the cases it prosecutes, is strongly 
related to obscenity. Since the FCC includes only sexual inde-
cency within the statutory. prohibition, the Court has never had 
to deal with justifications for regulating other sorts of offensive 
speech. Therefore, one approach to determine the reach of 
"indecency" is to examine the reasons for the prohibition of ob-
scenity.t2 
Not only sexually-offensive speech, but also non-sexual speech, 
such as racial and religious epithets, may be offensive. For exam-
ple, many people find the word "nigger" deeply offensive. In 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 13 the Supreme Court upheld prohibition 
• Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1972); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
• Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
•• For a discussion of this "two-level" theory, see notes 61-64 and accompanying text 
infra. 
11 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739. See notes 155-63 and accompanying text infra. Indecency, 
at least in the broadcast sense, is a superset of obscenity. 
12 See Part IA2 infra. 
11 343 U.S. 250 (1952). Beauharnois involved speech which, if directed at an individual, 
could be deemed libelous and thus unprotected. The leaflets distributed by the defendant 
called on the Chicago government to "halt the further encroachment, harassment, and 
invasion of white people ... by the Negro" and claimed that "[i]f persuasion and the 
need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, 
then the aggressions ... rapes, robberies, knives, guns, and marijuana of the negro, surely 
will." 343 U.S. at 252. 
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of such an epithet as a form of group libel. While Beauharnais is 
of dubious precedential value, 14 it raises the issue of whether rac-
ist speech, while offensive to many, can properly be regulated. 
The threat posed by most racist speech is twofold: offensiveness 
to the general audience and disparagement of the target racial or 
religious group. Furthermore, such speech subverts fundamental 
American principles of equality. Beauharnais, however, was 
based on group libel, not the offensiveness of the speech, and is 
therefore distinguishable from indecency cases where the speech 
is proscribed precisely because it is offensive. In group libel cases, 
the evil to be avoided is breach of the peace. 15 The mere offensive-
ness of such epithets is not a justification for regulation, however, 
since it is the idea and not the speech which gives offense. 18 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that where the 
speech itself causes harm, it may be regulated. Words "which by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace" are unprotected by the First Amendment. 17 
While this "fighting words" doctrine may seem able to subsume 
racially offensive speech, there are two problems with including 
such speech within its scope. First, in order for spoken words to 
be considered "fighting words," they must be void of any valid 
communicative function. 18 But the use of racially offensive terms 
should be viewed as a communication of ideas. It is the racist 
thought which give such words their offensive nature, and if it is 
the idea that gives offense, then the speech is protected. 19 Second, 
in order for spoken words to constitute "fighting words" they 
must tend to provoke an immediate breach of the peace. It is 
questionable whether racial epithets have that tendency, espe-
cially in the broadcast situation. The FCC has determined that 
under the circumstances of Stoner's 1972 Senate campaign they 
did not. 20 
" See Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 697-98 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978), in which the court upheld the right of American 
Nazis to march in a predominantly Jewish suburb of Chicago. In voting to grant certiorari 
in Collin, Justices Blackmun and White noted the need to resolve the possible conflict 
with Beauharnois as to the prohibition of racially-offensive speech. 439 U.S. at 919. 
The Court has noted that racial overtones do not strip speech of its First Amendment 
protection. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 134 (1966). 
" Beauharnois, 343 U.S. at 254. 
" See notes 72-75 and accompanying text infra. 
17 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
'" Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). 
" Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564,567 (1970); Village of Skokie v. National Social-
ist Party of America, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978). 
20 Atlanta NAACP, 36 F.C.C.2d 635 (1972); Note, Morality and the Broadcast Media: 
A Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory Standards, 84 HARV. L. REV. 664,673 (1971) 
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An examination of the justifications for the prohibition of un-
protected speech demonstrates that the reasons for the prohibi-
tion of indecency are closely related to those for the prohibition 
of obscenity. As the Court itself noted in Pacifica, "(indecent] 
words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends. " 21 The 
justifications for the prohibition of "fighting words," it has been 
shown, do not lend themselves to the regulation of indecency. 
2. Rationales for the prohibition of obscenity and inde-
cency-In Miller v. California, 22 a leading obscenity case, the 
Court concentrated on establishing a test for obscenity; minimal 
reference was made to the reasons for its prohibition. The only 
such explanation given by the Court was that "the States have a 
legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of 
obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it 
a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling re-
cipients or of exposure to juveniles."23 That statement, however, 
is of little help in determining why obscenity alone is regulated. 
It fails to state a legitimate state interest different from that 
which would mandate regulation of any offensive speech. 
Professor Kalven has suggested four justifications for the regu-
lation of obscenity: "(1) the incitement to antisocial sexual con-
duct; (2) psychological excitement resulting from sexual imagery; 
(3) the arousing of feelings of disgust and revulsion; and (4) the 
advocacy of improper sexual values."2• He summarily dismissed 
the second justification as unfit for governmental concern: the 
state has no reason to care about adult sexual fantasies. 25 The 
first justification, incitement of antisocial conduct, "evaporates 
in light of the absence of any evidence to show a connection 
between the written word and overt sexual behavior."26 Kalven's 
("For the most part, a prohibition that turns on the risk of provoking violence is obviously 
inapplicable to broadcasting."). 
See generally Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1972); Collin v. Smith, 
447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), af{'d, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 
(1978); Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667 
(N.D. Ill. 1976); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 
373 N.E.2d 21 (1978). 
21 438 U.S. at 746. 
12 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
23 Id. at 18-19. The Court also noted that the linguistic analysis of the word "obscene" 
focuses exclusively on its offensiveness or repugnancy to established values, but does not 
refer to sex. The legal definition of "obscene" is closer to that of pornography, and thus 
focuses on material dealing with sex. Id. at 18 n.2. Thus, offensiveness is an underlying 
justification for the regulation of obscenity. 
" Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 3-4. 
zs Id. at 4. But see J. PAUL & M. SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP: OBSCENITY IN THE MAIL 
199-200 (1961). 
" Kalven, supra note 24, at 4. 
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doubt has not been resolved since this formulation. A major gov-
ernment study found little if any effect of erotic material on sex-
ual behavior.27 
The fourth justification, advocacy of improper sexual values, is 
easily dismissed as an improper target of regulation. In Kalven's 
words, "[i]t is hard to see why the advocacy of improper sexual 
values should fare differently, as a constitutional matter, from 
any other exposition in the realm of ideas."28 All societal values 
are subject to criticism, including sexual values. The Supreme 
Court has permitted such advocacy;29 it is only when the material 
itself violates the norm that it is subject to regulation. 30 Although 
Kalven also dismisses the arousal of disgust and revulsion as "an 
impossibly trivial base for making speech a crime,"31 this justifi-
cation seems to be the one subsequently adopted by the Court.32 
One justification not suggested by Kalven is the maintenance 
of society's moral standards. Arguably, the state has a legitimate 
interest in preventing moral decay. The Supreme Court, in up-
holding a ban on obscene films, indicated that the government 
can legislate to maintain "the quality of life and the total com-
munity environment .... " 33 This view has been supported by 
a number of commentators, 34 and extends to the protection of an 
individual from self-harm and society from the effects of wide-
27 "In general, established patterns of sexual behavior were found to be very stable and 
not altered substantially by exposure to erotica. When sexual activity occurred following 
the viewing or reading of these materials, it constituted a temporary activation of individ-
uals' preexisting patterns of sexual behavior." THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCEN-
ITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 25 (1970) [hereinafter cited as OBSCENITY REPORT]. 
The Commission also could "not conclude that exposure to erotic materials is a factor 
in the causation of sex crimes or sex delinquency." Id. at 27. The Commission noted that 
in Denmark, "the increased availability of explicit sexual materials has been accompanied 
by a decrease in the incidence of sexual crime." Id. 
•• Kalven, supra note 24, at 4; accord, H. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY 208 
(1969); W. LoCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 989 (1975). 
'" In Kingsley Int'! Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89, the Court stated: 
It is contended that the State's action was justified because the motion picture 
attractively portrays a relationship which is contrary to the moral standards, the 
religious precepts, and the legal code of its citizenry. This argument misconceives 
what it is that the Constitution protects. Its guarantee is not confined to the 
expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority, It protects 
advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than 
advocacy of socialism or the single tax. 
30 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746 n.22; Robert Bork, Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, University 
of Michigan Law School (Panel Discussion, February 7, 1979). 
31 Kalven, supra note 24, at 4. 
•• See note 23 supra; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. See also H. CLOR, supra note 28, at 
198; w. LoCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, supra note 28, at 989. 
13 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973). 
" See, e.g., H. CLoR, supra note 28, at 175-206; Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: 
The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1963). 
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spread moral decay. The thesis underlying this position is that 
society shares certain values which serve a cohesive function. The 
origins of these values are irrelevant; it is their general acceptance 
that gives them their current validity. 35 
The need to protect against moral decay, a justification for 
regulation, can be refuted by the inherent right of society to 
change its standards. Society's moral values have changed,38 par-
ticularly in the past two decades. Advocacy is permitted, in part, 
so that society can alter its values. If there is a right to make this 
choice, there must be a right to exercise it. The underlying as-
sumption is that after considering the alternatives, society will 
indicate its choice by the general behavior of its members. One 
response to this argument is that it is the responsibility of the 
legislatures to gauge society's standards, and that some people 
may favor imposition of stricter standards than they would follow 
if left to decide for themselves. Another argument against regula-
tion of indecency under this justification is that the best remedy 
for moral decay may not be to ban it but to counter it with 
speech.37 
The effect which indecency has on children provides another 
rationale for its regulation. In considering obscenity cases, the 
Court has upheld a stricter standard of obscenity for material 
available to children.38 Regulation of otherwise protected speech 
thu~ depends on the audience as well as content; its availability 
to children may bring offensive speech within the scope of permis-
sible regulation. 39 Protection of children is not an absolute justifi-
cation for regulation, however, since there is little evidence to 
support the contention that exposure to pornography is harmful 
to juveniles. '0 
The justifications for regulating obscenity which seem both to 
have been adopted and to be reasonable are its offensiveness to 
the public, the prevention of moral decay, and the protection of 
children. All of these can also be bases for regulation of inde-
cency, 41 which is offensive to many and violative of established 
so The separation of church and state does not prevent the imposition of Biblical or 
other religious standards which have been adopted by society as a whole and are ·not 
limited to any particular group. Henkin, supra note 34, at 407-11. 
11 H. CLOR, supra note 28, at 192 . 
., But see id., ·ch. 5 . 
.. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See also text accompanying note 23 supra. 
st Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50. 
,. J. PAUL & M. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 194-95; R.EPoRT OF THE EFFECTS PANEL, 
OBSCENITY REPORT, supra note 27, at 139-255; Larrabee, The Cultural Context of Sex 
Censorship, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 672, 681 (1955); Note, supra note 20, at 681. 
" See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50; Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 
728 (1970); Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to be Spoken To?, 67 NW. 
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societal norms. 
3. The relationship between indecency and offensive-
ness-Speech related to sex has historically been regulated. 
There are many types of speech or broadcasts, however, which are 
offensive but not generally subject to regulation. The Court has 
devised no justification for this peculiar treatment of sexual mat-
ters, yet is continues to uphold the same regulation by com-
munity standards which would be unconstitutional if applied to 
other forms of speech, such as violence, sacrilege, vulgarity, and 
prejudice. 42 
The approach established by the Court in Pacifica for the regu-
lation of offensive speech appears to involve two steps. First, the 
Court determines whether the speech is indecent. Second, if the 
speech is deemed indecent, the Court determines if it is the mes-
sage and not just the method of expression which gives offense. 
If it is only the former, the speech has value to society and is 
protected despite its indecent nature. 43 
Under the first part of this test, it is possible to determine that 
non-sexual material is indecent. The sexual and excretory limita-
tion in Pacifica is the result of the FCC's interpretation of the 
statute, not a constitutional standard.44 Indecency, according to 
the Court, is a general term which "merely refers to nonconform-
ance with accepted standards of morality."45 Nothing in this defi-
nition specifically includes sex and eliminates other subjects. 
The justification for the regulation of indecency is the public's 
desire to be free from offensive communications. People find cer-
tain words or subjects upsetting and do not want to be confronted 
by them. Whatever the nature of a person's sensibilities, they 
represent individual values and choices and so deserve some de-
ference. It is impossible, however, to defer to every individual's 
judgment without stripping our conversations and broadcasts of 
all their color and emotive force. 48 Therefore, protection must be 
limited to regulation of "patently offensive" speech-speech 
which many or most people find extremely offensive. This stan-
dard would probably be most applicable to sexual or excretory 
references, since they are traditionally regarded as most likely to 
U.L. REV. 153 (1972). 
" Note, Offensive Speech and the FCC, 79 YALE L.J. 1343, 1363 (1970). 
" Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746-47. 
" The Court in Pacifica was only choosing between the FCC standard of patently 
offensive sexual or excretory references and Pacifica's argument for an obscenity standard. 
Therefore, it did not consider whether the prohibition could be broader than that urged 
by the FCC. Id. at 738-39. 
"Id. at 740. 
" See notes 76-79 and accompanying text infra. 
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give offense. 47 
In the second part of the test for offensive speech which is 
subject to regulation, sexual references are less likely to be con-
sidered as carrying messages than other forms of potentially of-
fensive speech. Offensive displays of violence, for instance, may 
raise questions and convey messages about our society. Sexual 
references, on the other hand, may or may not carry any mes-
sages. 
There is no universal definition of "indecent speech." At a 
minimum, it is offensive speech relating to sexual or excretory 
matters which is not within the obscenity standard. It is possible 
to include non-sexual offensive speech, but only if it is generally 
valueless. The more offensive the speech, the more likely it will 
be found "indecent"; the greater its social value, the less likely 
it will be found "indecent." The context in which it is presented, 
such as the time of day or program, also bears on its 
"indecency."48 The limitation is that it must be the speech itself, 
not the ideas conveyed by the speech, that gives offense. 
B. Protection of Political Speech 
Opposing the interest in protecting citizens from unwanted of-
fensive speech is the commitment to free speech enunciated in 
the First Amendment. It is necessary to examine both the reasons 
for protecting speech and the scope of speech to be protected. 
1. Types of First Amendment analysis-One theory of free 
speech is "absolutist": the language of the First Amendment pro-
hibits all governmental interference with speech. 49 This position 
has been rejected by the Supreme Court in a large number of 
cases both upholding50 and rejecting51 restraints on speech. Close 
" The Court in Pacifica noted this general tendency: 
The Commission stated [in its Pacifica ruling]: "Obnoxious, gutter language 
describing these [sexual and excretory] matters has the effect of debasing and 
brutalizing human beings by reducing them to their mere bodily functions . . . . " 
56 F.C.C. 2d, at 98. Our society has a tradition of performing certain bodily 
functions in private, and severely limiting the public exposure of discussion of 
such matters. Verbal or physical acts exposing those intimacies are offensive 
irrespective of any message that may accompany the exposure. 
438 U.S. at 746 n.23. See also Kalven, supra note 24, at 18. 
41 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750. 
" The major proponent of this position was Justice Black. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State 
Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56-81 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 
U.S. 109, 140-44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 43-63 
(1968) . 
.. See, e.g., Time, -Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476 (1957); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296 (1940); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
•• See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); New York Times Co. 
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to the "absolutist" position is the "maximum protection" theory 
proposed by Professors Dorsen and Gora, under which only cer-
tain "rigorously defined" categories of speech are subject to regu-
lation, and. then only under narrow circumstances.52 
Another theory, espoused by Professor Robert Bork, is that the 
only speech afforded First Amendment protection should be 
speech related to self-government. 53 Since the Constitution itself 
provides no clue as to the meaning of the First Amendment, the 
Court must look to the document as a whole. Since, in Bork's 
view, the purpose of the Constitution is to insure self-government, 
only speech relating to that function is protected by the First 
Amendment.5' This narrow construction of the Constitution has 
been rejected by the Supreme Court. In contrast, the Court has 
held that the First Amendment protects non-political as well as 
political speech.55 
Regardless of which interpretation of the First Amendment is 
adopted, speech relating to the conduct of government is pro-
tected. The Court has clearly included the discussion of public 
affairs within the scope of the First Amendment. The underlying 
concept is that encouragement of the discussion of all viewpoints 
leads to the proper resolution of questions. The Court noted in 
Red Lion Broadcasting u. FCC, "[i]t is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in 
which truth will ultimately prevail, " 58 and in another leading 
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
02 Address by Norman Dorsen, "The Burger Court and Free Expression: Property 
Rights or Maximum Protection," Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, University of Michigan 
Law School (February 6, 1979). These narrow circumstances include only military secrets, 
trade secrets, commercial misrepresentation, and assaultive. or shocking speech 
"equivalent to a slap in the face." 
., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 24-
25 (1971). In discussing Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 257, 275 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, J.J., concurring), Professor Bork notes four 
benefits of free speech protection. These are: 
"1. The development of the faculties of the individual; 
2. · The happiness to be derived from engaging in the activity; 
3. The provision of a safety valve for society; and, 
4. The discovery and spread of political truth." Bork, supra. 
•• Bork, supra note 53. This is largely based on the writings of Professor Meiklejohn, 
who views political speech as the primary application of the First Amendment. See Meik-
lejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, in A. MEIKLE.JOHN, POLITICAL 
FREEDOM 3 (1960). Professor Kalven claims that the Supreme Court began to accept this 
view in its 1964 decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Kalven, 
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 
1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221. 
•• United Mines Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (union employ-
ment of attorney for litigation of members); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) 
(invasion of privacy) . 
.. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). This "marketplace of ideas" theory was first enunciated in 
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case, the Court mentioned the "profound national commitment 
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhi-
bited, robust, and wide-open."57 Thus, political speech merits 
special protection. For the purposes of this article, "political 
speech" refers to any words used by a candidate for elective office 
in seeking that office. Paid political commercials, such as those 
sponsored by Busbee, 58 are especially relevant to this discussion 
because they are totally within the candidate's control and are 
thus most likely to be reflective of the candidate's true beliefs and 
traits. 
2. Applicable test-After establishing that the First Amend-
ment protects discussion of public issues, it is necessary to deter-
mine which standard of review to apply to a particular regulation. 
The "clear and present danger" test, first enunciated in Schenck 
v. United States, 59 is no longer dispositive. Although it has not 
been expressly overturned by the Court, Professor Kalven notes 
that it has fallen from use.80 
Another approach suggested for First Amendment questions is 
the "two-level" theory. Under this theory, speech is categorized 
Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting). 
57 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Prof. Kalven considers 
the Sullivan case to be the crucial opinion in First Amendment analysis because it identi-
fies the discussion of public issues as the activity central to free speech. 
The Amendment has a "central meaning"-a core of protected speech without 
which democracy cannot function, without which, in Madison's phrase, "the 
censorial power" would · be in the Government over the people and not "in the 
people over the Government." This is not the whole meaning of the Amendment. 
There are other freedoms protected by it. But at the center there is no doubt what 
speech is being protected and no doubt about why it is protected. The theory of 
the freedom of speech clause was put right side up for the first time. 
Kalven, supra note 54, at 208. This conclusion is based on the Court's absolute rejection 
of seditious libel laws. He further states that "[t)he touchstone of the First Amendment 
has become the abolition of seditious libel and what that implies about the function of 
free speech on public issues in American democracy." Id. at 209. 
08 See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra. 
•• 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Under this test created by Justice Holmes, "[t)he question in 
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances so as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress 
has a right to prevent." Id. at 52. In obscenity cases, the "substantive evils" being pre-
vented are those discussed in notes 22-41 and accompanying text supra . 
.. "[l)t is clear that, as of the judgment in the Times case, it has disappeared." Kalven, 
supra note 54, at 213-14. See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Douglas and 
Black, JJ., concurring); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 
YALE L.J. 877, 912 (1963). 
Kalven also asserts that the Court in Sullivan rejected the concept of less strict scrutiny 
of state enactments than of acts of the federal government, which is another approach for 
First Amendment scrutiny of regulation. This standard, however, is inapplicable to the 
discussion of broadcast regulation, which is a federal issue. See Kalven, supra note 54, at 
218-19. 
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as either protected or unprotected. Protected speech is free from 
almost all governmental interference whereas unprotected speech 
can be prohibited. The first category of speech is "that which is 
worthy enough to require the application of First Amendment 
protection" and the second category is beneath First Amendment 
concerns."81 Due to its rigidity, this strict dichotomy is no longer 
valid in most areas. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court 
held the dichotomy inapplicable to libel, one of the former bas-
tions of the test. 82 "Fighting words," while putatively within this 
unprotected area,83 are excluded only if maintenance of the peace 
outweighs freedom of speech in the context in which they are 
used. Kalven asserts that "[n]o matter how speech is classified, 
there must still be First Amendment consideration and review. 
No category of speech is any longer beneath the protection of the 
First Amendment. " 84 
The final approach is the balancing test. Professor Kalven re-
jects this approach, but his rejection is limited to the use of bal-
ancing for "sanctions ... imposed for the specific purpose of 
restricting speech . . . , " 85 as they are in the case of defamation 
(the subject of Sullivan). A balancing approach is permissible, 
according to Kalven, in those cases in which "control of speech 
is a by-product of government action that is otherwise permissi-
ble."88 It is unclear which of these two categories, as described by 
Kalven, would encompass regulation of the broadcast media. On 
the one hand, broadcast media regulation is "otherwise permissi-
11 Id. at 217. 
12 "[L]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must 
be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment." 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). 
13 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
" Kalven, supra note 54, at 217-18. The only flaw in this analysis is that obscenity is 
still considered unprotected once the speech is found to fall within certain specific bounda-
ries. He claims that "(o]bscenity, too, it would seem, 'can claim no talismanic immunity 
from constitutional limitations.'" Id. at 218. The Court has since held: "This much has 
been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First 
Amendment." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). See also Clor, Public Morality 
and Free Expression: The Judicial Search for Principles of Reconciliation, 28 HAST. L.J. 
1305, 1310 (1977), where the author states, "[t]hat which meets the stringent legal tests 
for obscenity may be censored; that which does not is subject to no restraints whatever 
except for wholly content-neutral 'time, place, and manner' ... regulations." 
Even this last bastion of the "two-level" approach yields something close to a balancing 
test. Before speech can be condemned as obscene, it must be shown that "taken as a 
whole, [it] lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller, 413 U.S. 
at 24. This type of speech is unworthy of First Amendment protection. The fact that 
patent offensiveness is required under Miller emphasizes the state interest in preventing 
offensive speech. 
•• Kalven, supra note 54, at 216. 
11 Id. This would include zoning regulations and other "time, place, and manner" 
restrictions. 
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ble" due to the need to allocate frequencies. On the other hand, 
regulation based on the offensive nature of the content is 
"imposed for the specific purpose of restricting speech." How-
ever, even in Sullivan, as Kalven noted, 67 the Court did not ac-
tually refuse to balance the interests of free speech and injury to 
reputation. Rather, it held that the "absolute" rule of non-
liability for defamation of public figures does not include state-
ments made with "actual malice. " 68 Thus, the balancing ap-
proach seems to remain viable in broadcasting, if not for all 
media. 
Finally, there is the approach which guarantees absolute pro-
tection for speech related to governmental functions. This analy-
sis, offered by Kalven, is inadequate because it ignores counter-
vailing interests. No matter how valuable speech of "governing 
importance" may be, it seems unreasonable to permit it when it 
is intended to and likely to cause an imminent breach of the 
peace or other "lawless action. "69 
The Court appears to have established a continuum of pro-
tected speech. It has rejected the Bork thesis, but has elevated 
speech concerning public issues to the status of most protected. 
The safeguards of the First Amendment have been most strin-
gently applied to speech of "governing importance."70 This policy 
is consistent with all the theories of free speech. Whether or not 
one believes that self-fulfillment and self-expression are impor-
tant First Amendment values, these values and the "marketplace 
of ideas" principle are served by the stringent protection of 
"governing" speech. It serves the need of the speaker to express 
his or her views and the need of the audience to hear all ideas. 
The weight given to speech in the balancing test depends on the 
locus of the speech on the continuum. The more it relates to 
government, the more worthy it is of protection. 
" Id. at 217. 
•• New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). 
" Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
70 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 410 U.S. 265, 272 (1971); Mills 
v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 279 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) 
("[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self. 
government."); Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977). 
One author states that "[s]ince the guarantees for speech and press in the first amend-
ment were intended to safeguard and promote effective self-government by the American 
people, then if our speech is to be effective to that end, our freedom of speech must 
embody the essential freedom to hear what is said .... " Comment, Freedom to Hear: A 
Political Justification of the First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REv. 311, 328 (1971). See also 
Powe, Or of the [Broadcast] Press, 55 TEx. L. REv. 39 (1976). 
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The public's need to hear is greatest during electoral cam-
paigns. In voting, the electorate utilizes the knowledge gained 
and the opinions formed in the campaign "marketplace." As the 
Supreme Court stated, "[i]t can hardly be doubted that the 
constitutional guarantee [of free speech] has its fullest and most 
urgent application to the conduct of campaigns for political 
office."71 
3. Aspect of speech to be regulated-A further question in the 
political speech area is how far regulation may intrude into the 
message. If political speech can be regulated when it is indecent, 
then it is necessary to sever the political content of the speech 
from the method of delivery. The difficult problem is what effect 
regulating the choice of words has on the content of the message. 
Offensiveness of content is not subject to regulation.72 In 
Pacifica, the Supreme Court stated that 
if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that conse-
quence is a reason for affording it constitutional protec-
tion. For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that 
the government must remain neutral in the marketplace 
of ideas. If there were any reason to believe that the Com-
mission's characterization of the Carlin monologue as of-
fensive ·could be traced to its political content-or even to 
tl;ie fact that it satirizeq contemporary attitudes about 
four letter words-First Amendment protection might be 
required. 73 
This standard supports the FCC's approach in the complaints 
against Stoner.74 The word "nigger" is offensive precisely because 
of the political and social meaning attached to it. Under the 
Court's interpretation of the First Amendment, the use of this 
racial epithet, despite its offensiveness to many, is protected.75 
As the Court's opinion in Pacifica16 indicated, the use of profan-
71 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971). 
72 See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Police Dep't of Chicago 
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
73 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745-46. 
" Bond's complaint was the second such plea for FCC action against Stoner. In his 1972 
bid for the Democratic Senatorial nomination, Stoner used commercials claiming that 
"[t]he main reason niggers want integration is because they want our white women." The 
FCC refused to prohibit these commercials, reasoning that the complaint was based on 
potential violence, not indecency. Atlanta NAACP, 36 F.C.C.2d 635 (1972). 
" See, e.g., the Skokie/Nazi cases: Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), af{'d, 
578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v. National 
Socialist Party of America, 51 Ill. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 347 (1977), aff'd in pertinent 
part, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978). 
" 438 U.S. at 746 n.22. The Court stated: "The Commission objects, not to [Carlin's] 
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ity can play an essential role in the discussion of public issues. 
The intensity of a candidate's feelings plays an integral role in the 
message he or she presents. Words which provide emotive impact 
deserve protection. It is as unacceptable to control the choice of 
words as it is to control the ideas expressed, since controlling 
words results in controlling ideas. The Supreme Court adopted 
this position in noting that a state is not only prohibited from 
preventing a person's expression of anti-draft sentiment, but can 
not punish his display of the words "Fuck the Draft" on his jacket 
to express this viewpoint. 77 The Court held that choice of words 
is an integral part of communication; the emotions attached to 
the word "fuck" were indeed part of the concept the defendant 
was trying to communicate.78 Moreover, the Court warned against 
assuming that "one can forbid particular words without also run-
ning a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. " 79 
It is possible, however, to distinguish the prohibition of certain 
words in Pacifica from their permissibility in a situation similar 
to Cohen. In Pacifica, according to the Court, the "indecent" 
words were not a part of any exposition of ideas. 80 When the same 
point of view, but to the way in which it is expressed." The Court also stated: "A require-
ment that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather 
than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot 
be expressed by the use of less offensive language." Id. at 743 n.18. 
77 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
71 Id. at 26. The Court stated that 
much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not 
only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inex-
pressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their 
emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitu-
tion, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or 
no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the 
more important element of the overall message to be communicated. 
As Professor Haiman notes, "it can hardly be maintained that. phrases like 'Repeal the 
Draft,' 'Resist the Draft,' or 'The Draft Must Go' convey essentially the same message as 
'Fuck the Draft.' Clearly something has been lost in the translation." 
Haiman, supra note 41, at 189. 
See also Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam opinion upholding 
the right of a student to print the word "motherfucker" in a school newspaper); Keefe v. 
Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969) (high school cannot prohibit teacher's use of the 
word "motherfucker" in an educational context). 
" 403 U.S. at 26. 
80 438 U.S. at 746. It is possible to dispute the Court's finding that the use of the 
"patently offensive" references to sexual or excretory functions and organs is not in itself 
political. In a footnote to the opinion, the Court analogized the use of indecency in 
discussing societal attitudes toward language to the use of obscene material in discussing 
societal attitudes toward obscenity. This analogy is unpersuasive, however, since obscen-
ity, as a legal term, lacks serious political value; obscene or pornographic printed material, 
on the other hand, may be protected under some circumstances. Yet the Court in Pacifica 
summarily dismissed the possibility that the broadcast of Carlin's monologue had any 
political or social value, despite the fact that it was part of a larger discussion of society's 
treatment of profanity. Id. at 746. 
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words are used in the context of a discussion of public issues, as 
in Cohen, they are protected as a part of that discussion.81 An 
alternative explanation is that the Court in Pacifica deliberately 
ignored the Cohen decision. This interpretation accounts for the 
Court's questionable determination that Carlin's use of indecent 
words was not part of his message. Pacifica may also indicate that 
the Court is retreating from Cohen. 
The third aspect of the content offensiveness is the use of inde-
cency in conjunction with, but not as an inherent part of, a politi-
cal message. This type of speech has some political value because 
a candidate's choice of words and campaign techniques may be 
relevant factors in the voters' determination of the candidate's 
fitness for office. As for the relationship of the indecent speech to 
the message conveyed, however, the speech is much less a part 
of the "exposition of ideas" than is the indecent speech discussed 
above. The use of indecent speech for shock value bears little 
relation to protected political speech. As such, it is more liable 
to be regulated and weighs less heavily on the side of free speech. 
First Amendment principles, however, seem to require that any 
doubt as to the political nature of speech be resolved in favor of 
its permissibility. 
Finally, protection only extends to speech made in the context 
of the campaign. One's status as a candidate for public office does 
not confer on the candidate a right to be free from the general 
restraints imposed on the public. The protection extends only to 
his or her candidacy, not to the candidate personally. A campaign 
cannot, for example, legitimize the distribution of obscene mate-
rial by a candidate who happens to be seeking office. 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT STATUS OF THE BROADCAST MEDIA 
If indecency is not coextensive with obscenity, 82 the question of 
the constitutionality of broadcast media regulation of "indecent" 
speech arises. Because the First Amendment provides that 
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press, "83 any regulation of the media, except for 
obscenity, 84 libel of private persons, 85 "fighting words, "88 viola-
" "[I]ndecency is largely a function of context-it cannot be judged in the abstract." 
Id. at 742. As the FCC later noted, "[t]he Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation . . . affords this Commission no general prerogative to intervene in any case 
where words similar or identical to those in Pacifica are broadcast .... " WGBH Educ. 
Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254 (1978) . 
., See notes 155-63 and accompanying text infra. 
13 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
84 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
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tions of national security, 87 and certain advocacy of unlawful acts 
or violence88 appears to be unconstitutional. It is well established, 
however, that broadcasting, although within the scope of the First 
Amendment, is subject to regulation which may include a 
broader degree of content control than other speech.89 The Su-
preme Court has ruled, for example, that Congress may impose 
a right of reply requirement for persons or viewpoints attacked on 
television or radio, 90 but that a similar state requirement imposed 
on newspapers violated freedom of the press. 91 
This limitation on the protection of the broadcast media does 
not sanction unlimited regulation. Any interference must be jus-
tified to the extent that it interposes legitimate state interests in 
place of First Amendment values. 92 It is therefore necessary to 
examine the reasons why "broadcasting ... has received the 
most limited First Amendment protection"93 and to determine if 
those reasons justify regulating indecency in political broadcasts. 
These reasons, which will be considered separately, are the lim-
ited number of broadcast frequencies and the pervasive nature of 
the broadcast media. 
A. The Scarcity Doctrine 
The primary justification offered for the different treatment of 
broadcast media is the limited number of stations physically able 
to broadcast within a given area.94 The scarcity doctrine justifies 
" Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964). 
88 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
87 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
88 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 
(1919). 
81 See, e.g., Pacifica; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Mt. 
Mansfield Tel., Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971); Report and Statement of Policy 
Res: Commission en bane Programing Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960). 
'° Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
11 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
" See generally Pacifica; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); 
WGBH Educ. Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250 (1978). 
" Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. 
" Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969): "Where there are 
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allo-
cate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable 
to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." This doctrine originally 
appeared in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-227 (1943). See 
also Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). 
Many commentators have also noted its acceptance as a major justification for regulation. 
See Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213 
(1975); Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial 
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Congress' decision to award licenses to stations operating in the 
public interest.95 The basic rationale is that the government had 
to devise some method of allocating the limited number of avail-
able frequencies. While a number of systems were possible, such 
as awarding licenses to the highest bidder or by lottery, Congress 
elected to license those stations which best serve the public inter-
est. The decision as to who would be the best licensee was vested 
in the FCC, 98 which has the power to consider broadcasting con-
tent when determining whether the public interest is served. 
There are, however, two reasons why the scarcity doctrine does 
not justify the regulation of indecency in political broadcasting: 
the lack of a logical nexus between scarcity and content regula-
tion, and the vagueness of the public interest standard. 
1. Scarcity as a justification for content control-The scarcity 
doctrine has come under very strong criticism as a justification 
for content control. First, it is questionable whether radio and 
television frequencies actually are scarce resources.97 With the 
possible exception of a few major cities, there are no television 
markets in which the spectrum of available frequencies is satu-
rated. 98 It would be possible, from a purely technological stand-
point, vastly to increase the number of stations in every market, 
especially given the recent development of a broad cable 
"spectrum."" Economic rather than technical limitations have 
prevented the expansion of station ownership. 100 In distinguishing 
between the print and broadcasting media, the problem of scar-
city is misleading. There are only slightly fewer licensed televi-
sion stations in the country than there are newspapers, and the 
addition of cable television will probably equalize the numbers. 101 
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1976); Kalven, Broadcasting, Public 
Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAw & EcoN. 15 (1967); Powe, supra note 70. 
15 47 u.s.c. § 307 (1976). 
"Id. 
" Bazelon, supra note 94, at 223. See also Note, Concepts of the Broadcast Media Under 
the First Amendment: A Reevaluation and a Proposal, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 83 (1972). 
" While some radio markets may be saturated, there is no scarcity of radio stations 
when compared with print outlets. See text accompanying note 102 infra. 
" Project, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 867, 983 
(1972). 
•00 Powe, supra note 70, at 57. 
••• Id. at 56. Professor Powe goes on to state that 
if the concept of scarcity includes any consideration of intramedia competition, 
then newspapers . . . become more likely candidates for regulation. Virtually all 
cities have competition among at least three television stations and a dozen radio 
signals. Yet in only one of every twenty-five cities is there a competing daily 
newspaper available. 
Id. at 57. 
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The 1768 daily newspapers in the country are far exceeded_ by the 
8034 licensed radio stations. 102 Thus, scarcity of resources speaks 
no more forcefully for the regulation of broadcasting than it does 
for the regulation of the print media. 
Even if there is scarcity of available frequencies, it is not appar-
ent that this situation justifies any content regulation. Despite 
the Supreme Court decisions upholding content control, 183 there 
is nothing inherent in the need for frequency allocation which 
justifies interference with the content of a particular commercial 
broadcast. 104 The general need to allocate does not justify such 
thorough regulation of the broadcast media. 
Professor Kalven offers a useful analogy for the allocation prob-
lem. The FCC's power to control access to broadcast frequencies 
is like the power held by a town meeting chairperson who can · 
prevent two participants from speaking simultaneously but has 
no right of control over what they say in their alloted times. 105 
Content control of political commercials would not serve this allo-
cation function. The town meeting chairperson's duty is to insure 
that different points of view are considered. This function is best 
served by allowing _all candidates to speak freely. The chairperson 
exceeds his or her responsibility as much by interfering with the 
way a speaker's views are presented as by controlling what is said. 
The mistake in. using the scarcity doctrine as a rationale for 
content regulation lies in the assumption that once regulation is 
imposed, it can be expanded beyond its original purpose. Judge 
Bazelon has noted that the key to the doctrine "is the limited 
number of frequencies and not the mere existence of licensing."106 
It is not apparent how the method of expression of a particular 
broadcast relates to the function of frequency allocation. 107 At the 
extreme, it is conceivable that repeated use of indecency on the 
air justifies awarding a license to a new owner at renewal time, 
since licensing is related to allocation. It is wrong, however, to 
associate the imposition of a fine, such as that in Pacifica, with 
1• 2 Id. at 56. 
103 See cases cited in note 94 supra. 
1°' See Bollinger, supra note 94; Kalven, supra note 94, at 37. It is interesting, as 
Professor Kalven notes, that the broadcast media have generally accepted the regulation 
of content. "First, the industry has under-estimated its legal position and given up too 
soon. Second, on the assumption that its legal position is weak, it has neglected the 
possibility of building policy, not legal arguments, upon the First Amendment." Kalven, 
supra note 94, at 24 (emphasis in original). 
105 Id. at 47-48. 
"' Bazelon, supra note 94, at 223. 
107 "[The argument) that technical scarcity necessitates licensing of broadcast facili-
ties, does not compel the conclusion that program content may be regulated." Note, supra 
note 42, at 1351. See also Kalven, supra note 94. 
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the need to allocate scarce resources. 108 
2. The "public interest" as a justification for content con-
trol-In choosing criteria for allocation of frequencies, Congress 
decided to grant licenses to those stations which best serve the 
public interest. rn9 This standard is vague, since the statute does 
not define the term "public interest." For example, the public has 
a strong interest in knowing all it can about the candidates for 
public office. Therefore, it is at least arguable that the public 
interest is better served by allowing candidates to say whatever 
they wish than by showing a censored version of the broadcast. 
A candidate's decision to use "indecent" language is one factor 
the voters may wish to take into account. If a voter finds a partic-
ular term grossly offensive, whether it is the word "nigger" or one 
of the words proscribed in Pacifica, he or she may decide to vote 
against a candidate for using it. In addition, the emotive force 
behind some words is as important to the speech as the idea. To 
prohibit Stoner from saying "nigger" would deny the voters of 
Georgia the chance to judge the depth of his racism; to prevent 
another candidate from using vulgarity would deny voters the 
chance to judge the strength of the candidate's feelings. The pub-
lic interest is best served when freedom from offensive speech 
yields to the needs of the electoral system. Seen in this light, the 
decision to meet the need for frequency allocation by regulating 
in the public interest does not justify any control over the content 
of political broadcasts. Thus, the scarcity doctrine is a weak justi-
fication for content control, particularly in a political context. 
B. Pervasive Nature 
The second justification for controlling the broadcast media is 
their "pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans." 110 There 
are two aspects to this theory: the "captive" nature of the audi-
ence and the great influence of the broadcast media. 
1. Captive audience-Under one prong of the pervasive na-
, .. As one author suggested in a discussion of the Court of Appeals' decision in Pacifica, 
"[t]hat governmental evaluation of program content might be necessary in this limited 
context [specific licensing decisions] ... by no means supports proscription of specific 
words or a specific broadcast." Comment, Pacifica Foundation v. FCC: "Filthy Words," 
the First Amendment, and the Broadcast Media, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 164, 177 (1978). 
109 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1976) provides: "The Commission, if public convenience, inter-
est, or necessity will be served thereby ... shall grant to any applicant therefor a station 
license provided for by this chapter." 
11• Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748; Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). See also Bazelon, supra note 94, at 221 ("It is simply 
impossible to exaggerate the impact of TV in particular on our lives and the lives of our 
children."). 
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ture approach, regulation is permitted because of the "passive" 
nature of the audience's reception of the message. A commercial, 
for instance, is thrust upon the viewer of an entertainment pro-
gram. The commercial is, to a degree, an involuntary exposure to 
material which may be indecent. 
The right to privacy may in some circumstances justify govern-
mental intrusion into broadcast content. Courts have applied it 
to protect the viewer or listener from language deemed 
"indecent" under 18 U.S.C. § 1464.111 In such a situation, the 
First Amendment is balanced against the right of the viewer to 
be free from the intrusion of unwanted messages. 112 The Supreme 
Court has noted that "the right of every person 'to be let alone' 
must be placed on the scales with the right of others to communi-
cate .... [N]othing in the Constitution compels us to listen to 
or view any unwanted communication, whatever its 
merit .... " 113 This right, however, has limited applicability to 
the broadcast media. While the right "to be let alone" has been 
applied to justify content regulation, 114 television and radio con-
stitute a voluntary exposure to possibly unwanted messages. The 
audience is aware of the potential offensiveness of commercials 
or regular programming, whether the offensiveness is sexual, rac-
ist, violent, or sexually stereotyped. By watching television, the 
viewers voluntarily expose themselves to the possibility of being 
offended. The Supreme Court has noted that even by stepping 
out into public people risk being offended, 115 but the sudden con-
frontation with indecency can be ended immediately. Thus, the 
burden is on the viewer "'to avoid bombardment of [his] sensi-
bilities by simply averting [his] eyes' " 116 because turning on a 
television or radio is as voluntary an act as walking outside. 
In recognizing a right to be free from unwanted mailings, the 
Court analogized to the right of a television viewer or radio lis-
tener to "twist the dial to cut off an offensive or boring communi-
cation and thus bar its entering his home." 117 Unlike unsolicited 
mail, television is not an unwanted intruder into the home. Nev-
111 See notes 155-63 and accompanying text infra. 
112 See, e.g., Haiman, supra note 41. 
"' Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970) (upholding 
39 U.S.C. § 4009, which allows people to prevent futher receipt of unsolicited, sexually-
offensive mailings); cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (people assume the risk of 
being offended in their daily dealings in society). 
11
' See note 110 supra. 
115 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975); Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971). 
11• Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (nudity at drive-in 
theater), quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). 
117 Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970). 
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ertheless, the Supreme Court in Pacifica held that this privacy 
interest justified the Congressional ban on indecency over the 
airwaves. The suggestion by Justice Brennan in dissent that the 
offended listener could simply turn off his or her radio was re-
. jected. 118 The Court cited Rowan v. United States Post Office 
Department119 in applying the privacy interest, 120 yet ignored its 
specific direction that the proper remedy is to shut off the televi-
sion or radio. 121 If this option is insufficient to deal with the of-
fense thrust upon the audience, the stations could be required to 
issue warnings before the broadcast. 122 
The Pacifica holding relied heavily on the Court's finding a 
lack of political or social value in the broadcast. 123 Political broad-
casts, however, since they are intended to influence the outcome 
of elections, have the requisite political value to remove them 
from the sphere of broadcasting which may be regulated. It is in 
these circumstances that the First Amendment's prohibition 
should be fully applied. m 
2. Influence of broadcasting-The second prong of the perva-
sive nature approach is the power of the broadcasting media to 
influence the audience. 125 The mere fact that a medium influences 
118 438 U.S. at 765-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
'" 397 U.S. 728 (1970). 
,,. Id. at 748. 
121 See note 117 and accompanying text supra. "[N]o one is ever legally required to 
listen or watch, and the captive audience rationale only has meaning within a context in 
which the listener is without choice." Powe, supra note 70, at 65. 
122 Note, supra note 42, at 1365. For example, the stations broadcasting "Scared 
Straight," a documentary about a program involving convicts and juvenile offenders, 
warned the audience about the use of "street language" which was essential to the broad-
cast. The number of people tuning in after the warning but during a commercial would 
probably be too small to warrant consideration; in a longer broadcast, the warning could 
be repeated. 
123 438 U.S. at 745-46. The decision in Pacifica is questionable for this reason. Carlin's 
routine itself clearly has a political or social value, since it is a discussion of society',, 
treatment of certain words. The particular broadcast by WBAI was part of a program 
about society's attitude toward language. The Court attempted to separate the idea from 
the mode of its expression. To find the words offensive, however, required a rejection of 
Carlin's viewpoint. Carlin described the seven )VOrds as "the words you couldn't say on 
the public airwaves"; apparently he was at least partially correct. 
It is interesting to note that the FCC intends "strictly to observe the narrowness of the 
Pacifica holding." WGBH Educ. Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254 (1978). 
"' Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971); Baldwin v. Redwood City, 
540 F.2d 1360, 1366 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977). See also Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966). See notes 128-
29 and accompanying text infra. 
123 Bazelon, supra note 94, at 220-24; Note, supra note 99, at 995: "Television is perhaps 
the most powerful and persuasive medium for, by its nature, it engenders a high degree 
of participation from its audience. In addition, television can assemble an enormous 
audience for its presentations, particularly during prime time." See generally M. McLU-
HAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1964). 
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people does not, however, justify its regulation. As Judge Bazelon 
stated, it is wrong "to suggest that the force of a particular mode 
of speech in and of itself permits a generalized regulation of 
speech." 128 Freedom of the press would be a useless principle if the 
press were unable to exert any influence on the public. 127 
The power of television and radio to influence the audience 
actually is a reason to prohibit regulation, especially when con-
sidering political broadcasts. It is undeniable that broadcasting 
has a tremendous impact on political campaigns and elections. 128 
Any interference with political broadcasting therefore constitutes 
interference with an important element of the electoral process. 
If the electoral process is a highly protected First Amendment 
interest and broadcasting is essential to modern political cam-
paigns, 129 it follows that political broadcasting should be among 
the most protected interests. Thus, the free speech interest 
should weigh heavily against the interest in freedom from offen-
sive speech. When these interests are balanced, it appears that 
the constitutional dangers involved in restraining political broad-
casts are not justified by the right to be free from occasional 
unexpected indecent words. Indecent words, even if used for their 
shock value, should not be regulated since they play a genuine, 
though perhaps minor, role in political discussions. 
1
" Bazelon, supra note 94, at 222. 
ii, "The power to influence is a power which has always been exercised by all forms of 
news media .... This fact standing alone does not call for different regulation of televi-
sion, any more than newspapers should have been regulated when they were the dominant 
source of news." Note, supra note 99, at 941. 
111 See J. BROWN & P. STEIB, THE ART OF POLITICS (1976); R. MACNEIL, THE PEOPLE 
MACHINE: THE INFLUENCE OF TELEVISION ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1968); J. MCGUINESS, THE 
SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1968 (1968); G. POMPER, VOTERS' CHOICE 34 (1975); W. ROPER, 
WINNING POLITICS 110 (1978); T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF A PRESIDENT-1968 196-97 (1969); 
T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF A PRESIDENT-1960 279-95 (1961); Alexander, Communications 
and Politics: The Media and the Message, in THE NEW STYLE IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 368 
(R. Agranoff ed. 1972) ("[T]he most influential tool of the new communications has 
been television."); National Journal, Politicking on Television, in THE NEW STYLE IN 
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 280 (R. Agranoff ed. 1972) ("Political power is measured in terms of 
access to TV.") (quoting N. JOHNSON, How TO TALK BACK TO YouR TELEVISION SET 1970)); 
Note, supra note 99, at 936. But see Powe, supra note 70, at 58-59, in which the author 
questions the impact of television on the formation of political views. But Professor Powe 
goes on to state that television tends to reinforce established views: "[the) potential 
power of television probably derives more from the power to persuade further the already 
persuaded than from the power to influence the uncommitted." Id. at 59. This effect is 
an important measure of television's influence, however, since further persuasion may 
motivate the already persuaded to register their views on Election Day. 
121 Kaufman, The Medium, the Message, and the First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 
761, 773 (1970) ("In a large metropolitan area, a candidate without television time is not 
a candidate at all."); National Journal, supra note 128, at 279; Note, supra note 42, at 
1351 ("Political elections are won and lost on television; a 'media blackout,' or even poor 
coverage, makes election to important offices virtually impossible for the victim."). 
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C. Presence of Children in the Audience 
Another justification given for differing treatment of the broad-
cast media is that "broadcasting is uniquely accessible to chil-
dren, even those too young to read." 130 This rationale is unique 
to Pacifica. The dissenting opinion noted that it expanded a doc-
trine previously confined to cases of obscenity. With the excep-
tion of erotic materials appealing to the prurient interests of mi-
nors, the government had previously left judgments of propriety 
to parents and had not attempted to determine what children 
should see or hear. 131 
In addition to making decisions which have formerly been left 
to parental discretion, this extension differs significantly from the 
use of less stringent obscenity standards for minors. In establish-
ing the different standards, the Court in Ginsberg u. New York 
upheld a state prohibition against the sale of pornography to 
ininors, 132 but in no way interfered with the right of adults to 
purchase such materials. 133 Thus, the state did not "reduce the 
adult population ... to reading only what is fit for children." 134 
In broadcast regulation, however, the government achieves this 
very result. Under Pacifica adults can see or hear only that which 
the government deems appropriate for minors, at least at certain 
times of the day. 
The interest in preventing exposure of children to indecency is 
a valid concern; even the most diligent parent may find it diffi-
cult to "screen" all of the material available to his or her children. 
Instead of totally eliminating offensive matter in a broadcast, 
however, warnings could be issued for programs which are not 
"suitable" for children. As in Pacifica, the time of day is a factor 
in political broadcasts, 135 but a candidate is unlikely to target his 
or her advertising to time slots filled by children's programming. 
There is little likelihood, for example, that the offending commer-
cial would be broadcast during Saturday morning cartoon pro-
grams. Therefore, the protection of children from this "evil," 
which has never been proven harmful, 131 should not be allowed to 
interfere with freedom of political speech. 
130 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749. 
131 Id. at 767-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 42, at 1366; Comment, supra 
note 108, at 182. 
1• 2 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
133 Id. at 634-35. 
131 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). 
130 The Court held that the time of day (two o'clock in the afternoon in Pacifica) is one 
relevant factor in the "host of variables" to be considered. 438 U.S. at 750. 
131 See notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra. 
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D. Partial Regulation Theory 
93 
An interesting approach to the broadcast/print media distinc-
tion has been suggested by Professor Bollinger. 137 He points out 
that there are no valid differences between the two forms of com-
munication justifying differing constitutional treatment, but that 
Americans have almost universally accepted regulation of televi-
sion and radio. 138 There are two incompatible yet desirable inter-
ests competing in determining the proper extent of media regula-
tion. On the one hand, enforcing a degree of open access to the 
media supports the goals of the First Amendment by preventing 
monopolization of communications channels, a possibility which 
is as dangerous as government censorship. Open access regula-
tion, on the other hand, is by definition a restraint on the press. 
Professor Bollinger notes three adverse effects of access regula-
tion:139 
1. The necessity of providing reply time would have a 
"chilling effect" on the licensees' motivation to cover and discuss 
political matters. 
2. The administrative mechanism may be abused in order to 
manipulate the opinions espoused by the media. 
3. Once regulation is permitted for a legitimate, limited pur-
pose, it may tend to escalate into broader regulation. This is 
known as the "camel's-nose-in-the-tent" phenomenon. These 
factors threaten the policy that "debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 140 
The proper approach to the difference in treatment, according 
to Bollinger, is to realize that different standards exist precisely 
because there is no rational distinction between the two media 
forms. Instead of balancing the two competing interests or adopt-
ing one to the exclusion of the other, each interest is assigned to 
a single media form. The commitment to open access is repre-
sented by the system of broadcast frequency allocation and the 
right of reply guarantees (the Equal Time provision and the Fair-
ness Doctrine141 ) imposed on the broadcasting media. 142 The bene-
117 Bollinger, supra note 94. 
113 Id. at 17. Professor Bollinger suggests that this public acceptance may be based on 
the history of judicial rejection of the First Amendment's applicability to broadcasting, 
the entertainment orientation of the broadcast media, uncertainty as to the technical 
nature, capabilities, and dangers of broadcasting, and an exaggerated reaction to the need 
for frequency allocation. Id. at 18-20. See also Kalven, supra note 94, at 16. 
111 Bollinger, supra note 94, at 29-31. 
''° New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See Part IB supra. 
'" 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). 
141 Bollinger, supra note 94, at 27-29. 
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fits of non-regulation, on the other hand, are preserved by the 
stricter ban on governmental interference with the print media. 
Analyzing the issue in terms of the two media forms 
"facilitate[s] realization of the benefits of two distinct constitu-
tional values, both of which ought to be fostered. " 143 
We now ask how this scheme of partial regulation, 
"unknowingly" adopted by the Court, 144 would affect the analysis 
of indecency in political broadcasting. It is useful to apply an 
analysis similar to Professor Bollinger's by substituting the audi-
ence's privacy interest for the access factor as the interest oppos-
ing non-regulation. Regulation may be justifiable in the broad-
cast media in order to protect the privacy interest in being free 
from unwanted, offensive communications. 145 The opposing inter-
est in unregulated political speech would still find a home in the 
print media. As Professor Bollinger contends, an exclusionary 
balancing test would be unnecessary since each interest would be 
protected. 
While this resolution may be theoretically satisfactory, it is 
unworkable in a practical political situation. Bollinger's approach 
requires that the two media forms be equal. Any inequality be-
tween them would make balancing necessary, so that the more 
valuable interest would be allocated to the more effective media 
form. In the political context, however, the broadcast media have 
a much stronger impact and a much broader audience than their 
non broadcast counterparts. 148 The approach suggested by Profes-
sor Bollinger would deny the use of the preferable campaign 
media to the "preferred" interest of political speech. This policy 
would not, therefore, yield a fair allocation of resources. 
The alternative application of the Bollinger approach, regulat-
ing the print media instead of the broadcast media, is equally 
unattractive. It would not satisfy those asserting the privacy in-
terest because the print media do not present the sudden, una-
voidable messages delivered by television or radio. Furthermore, 
regulation of the print media is blatantly repulsive to our consti-
tutional history. 147 
"' Id. at 36. 
, .. Id. at 27. Professor Bollinger contends that the Court reached the correct result 
(partial regulation) for the wrong reason (supposed differences between the media forms). 
'" See Part 11B supra. 
"' See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 129, at 773: "Some media are particularly effective 
for the expression of certain specific messages, and the prohibition of those media would 
greatly impair the ability of speakers effectively to advocate those causes." See also 
Bazelon, supra note 94; Powe, supra note 70, at 45;· Note, supra note 99, at 936 (60% of 
adult Americans rely on television for news); Note, supra note 42. 
"' Regulation of broadcasting may be more palatable than regulation of print because 
broadcasting, as a relatively new method of communication, has not had the long free 
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The normal justifications for regulation of broadcast political 
speech which the Court has adopted for prohibitions imposed on 
the broadcast media must be balanced against the ultimate First 
Amendment goal of free political speech. When these interests are 
compared, the need for a fully-informed electorate should out-
weigh the right to be free from unwanted communications from 
an invited source and the other justifications for differing treat-
ment. Therefore, the constitutional standard of free speech 
should apply even to the broadcast media. One commentator has 
stated that "[t)he search for an intellectual rationale to support 
broadcast regulation is in reality a post hoc attempt to explain 
the status quo. " 148 The mere existence of regulation cannot serve 
as a justification for overriding an integral constitutional value. 
It is unwise to allow regulation which eliminates only the inde-
cent aspect of the communication, since this constitutes interfer-
ence with free political speech. The First Amendment guarantee 
protects the way in which ideas are expressed as well as the con-
tent of those ideas. In all but a few circumstances, indecency 
serves an important function in the candidate's message. It may 
add emotive impact to what is being said, as in Cohen; it might 
show the depth of a candidate's feelings, as in Stoner's campaign; 
or it may merely reflect an aspect of the candidate's personality 
which the voters may wish to consider. In all of these circum-
stances it serves a role in the electoral process which deE;erves 
protection. 
III. STATUTORY ISSUES 
If it is assumed that some regulation of political broadcasting 
is constitutional, it is necessary to determine whether the existing 
statutes permit such regulation. A variety of conflicting statutes 
are presently in effect. 149 These include a ban on indecent Ian-
speech history associated with newspapers. As Professor Kalven notes, "we all take as 
commonplace a degree of government surveillance for broadcasting which would by in-
stant reflex ignite the fiercest protest were it found in other areas of communication." 
Kalven, supra note 94, at 16. 
'" Powe, supra note 70, at 62. See also Bollinger, supra note 94, at 17-20; Kalven, supra 
note 94, at 16; Note, supra note 99, at 984. 
"' Most of the relevant ones are from the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 
codified in Title 47 of the United States Code. For a comprehensive discussion of the 
current FCC regulations and statutes governing political broadcasting, see National Asso-
ciation of Broadcasters, The Political Catechism (8th ed. 1976). 
A bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Van Deerlin 
to revise the Communications Act for the first time since 1934. H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1979). This bill would eliminate the public interest standard of regulation. Two 
bills to amend the 1934 act have been introduced in the Senate. One, by Senator Hollings, 
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guage, 150 a prohibition of censorship by the FCC, 151 and a section 
on the responsibility of stations towards political candidates.152 
When all of the statutory factors are considered, however, neither 
the FCC nor individual stations have power to control the content 
of political commercials. Moreover, stations are not liable for that 
content. 153 The status of non-commercial political broadcasts is 
less certain, but the relevant regulatory power is weak. 15' 
A. Prohibition of Indecency 
Section 1464 of the Federal Criminal Code makes it unlawful 
to "utter any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of 
radio communication .... " 155 This article has assumed the ex-
istence of broadcast "indecency" in the foregoing discussion of 
the constitutional issues. At this point it is appropriate to discuss 
the term as used in the statute. 
Despite decisions to the contrary, 158 it is now well established 
that indecency is not coextensive with the constitutional stan-
dard for obscenity.157 Unlike the obscenity standards, the stan-
dard for indecency in broadcasting does not require an appeal to 
prurient interest. 158 The basic elements of indecency are its 
"nonconformance with accepted standards of morality" 159 or of-
fensiveness by contemporary community standards.180 
Except for the two FCC decisions ruling that Stoner's use of the 
would not affect any of the provisions discussed in this section. S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1979). The other bill, introduced by Senator Goldwater, would eliminate the public 
interest standard for licensing radio stations, but not for television. S. 622, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. § 333(a) (1979). 
"" 18 u.s.c. § 1464 (1976). 
1• 1 47 u.s.c. § 326 (1976). 
112 47 u.s.c. § 315 (1976). 
153 See notes 180-81 and accompanying text infra. 
1 .. The prohibition of station content regulation in § 315(a) is limited to paid commer-
cials. 
153 18 u.s.c. § 1464 (1976). 
1 .. United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1977); Duncan v. United States, 48 
F.2d 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 863 (1931). 
1• 1 See text accompanying notes 8-12 supra. 
1 .. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739-41; Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 
F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972); Eastern 
Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970). In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), 
the Supreme Court held that indecency is identical to obscenity in mailing cases under 
18 U.S.C. § 1461. Pacifica distinguished the standards for broadcasting on the grounds 
that broader standards can, under the Constitution, be adopted under § 1464 than under 
§ 1461, since the mail is subject to full First Amendment protection, while broadcasting 
is not. 438 U.S. at 740-41. 
,., Id. at 740. 
190 Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975); 
Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972). 
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word "nigger" was not indecent, 181 all other reported section 1464 
cases involved references to sexual subjects .. The Pacifica deci-
sion, in holding that the statute was not unconstitutionally 
vague, held that "[a]t most ... the Commission's definition of 
indecency will deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive 
references to excretory and sexual organs and activities." 182 
Therefore, situations such as the Stoner commercials would be 
outside the realm of "indecent" speech, as currently defined by 
the FCC, despite its offensiveness to many. 
The problem thus becomes one of determining which words 
dealing with sex or excretion are indecent. One important factor 
is the context in which the particular offensive words were used, 
a factor on which Pacifica relies heavily .183 The use of offensive 
or excretory terms for their shock value at a time when children 
would be expected to be in the audience could thus bring a politi-
cal commercial within the prohibition of section 1464.184 
B. FCC Enforcement Authority 
If a political commercial contains indecency proscribed by sec-
tion 1464, it is necessary to consider the authority of the FCC to 
prevent or sanction its broadcast. Because section 326 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 precludes the FCC from imposing 
any censorship, 185 the FCC cannot prevent the broadcast of 
"indecent" material. This section "unequivocally denies the 
Commission any power to edit proposed broadcasts in advance 
and to excise materials considered inappropriate for the air-
waves. "188 
Under the Act, however, the FCC may enforce its sanctions 
"' Julian Bond, 69 F.C.C.2d 943 (1978); Atlanta NAACP, 36 F.C.C.2d 635 (1972). 
112 438 U.S. at 743. 
113 See note 81 supra. 
"' See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50. 
115 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976) provides: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission 
the power of censorship over the radio communication or signals transmitted by 
any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed 
by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means 
of radio communication. 
This prohibition would not be affected by the proposed revisions of the Communications 
Act discussed in note 149 supra. The House bill provides that "nothing in this Act shall 
be construed to give the Commission the power to censor or otherwise regulate the content 
of any transmission ... " except for a few inapplicable exceptions. H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. § 422 (1979). 
'" Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735. The FCC has indicated that Pacifica did not grant it broad 
authority to intervene before the broadcast of words identical to those used by Carlin. 
WGBH Educ. Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254 (1978); Julian Bond, 69 F.C.C.2d 943 
(1978). 
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against indecency. The Commission has three available remedies 
for violations of section 1464: license revocation, 167 issuance of a 
cease and desist order, 168 and fines of up to $1000. 169 This author-
ity, despite its possible "chilling effect," is not inconsistent with 
section 326. Thus, while the FCC may not censor "indecent" 
broadcasts, it may punish them after the broadcasts. 170 
The FCC's remedial sanctioning authority can only be exer-
cised against the licensee station or sfations broadcasting the 
indecent matter, not against the sponsoring candidate. The Su-
preme Court, however, has held that the stations are immune 
from criminal prosecutions for defamation in political commer-
cials due to the contradictory mandates of the law .171 Stations 
should be equally immune from all FCC sanctions under section 
1464.172 
C. Station Responsibility and Liability 
The major question regarding indecency in political commer-
cials involves section 1464 and other statutes governing political 
broadcasts. Section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 
completely bars content control by the stations. 173 Once air time 
is purchased, the station is powerless to control its use. 174 Al-
117 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6) (1976). 
118 47 U.S.C. § 312(b)(2) (1976). 
"' 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(e) (1976). 
170 "The prohibition [of§ 326) ... has never been construed to deny the Commission 
the power to review the content of completed broadcasts in the performance of its regula-
tory duties." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735; Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 
403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969). 
171 See notes 180-81 and accompanying text infra. Section 315(a) of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 states: 
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for 
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities 
to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: 
Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material 
broadcast under the provisions of this subsection. No obligation is imposed under 
this section to allow the use of its stations by any such candidate. 
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). 
171 See notes 180-81 and accompanying text infra. 
173 For the text of§ 315(a), see note 171 supra. 
17' Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Farmers Educ. & Coop. 
Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959); FCC Primer on Political Broadcasting and 
Cablecasting, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,342 at 36,348 (1978). The Supreme Court in Farmers Union 
defined the prohibited censorship as "any examination of thought or expression in order 
to prevent publication of 'objectionable' material." 360 U.S. at 527 (emphasis in original). 
The proposed revision of the Communications Act would continue the ban on station 
censorship. "Such television broadcasting station licensee shall have no control over the 
content or format of any material broadcast under the provisions of this section." H.R. 
3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 463(a)(2) (1979). This new "equal opportunity" section, 
however, would only apply to paid commercials, not to time donated by the station. The 
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though section 315(a) is generally known as the Equal Time pro-
vision, the prohibition on censorship applies to "first 
uses"-political statements not made in reply to previous broad-
casts-as well as to time which is required to be sold or given 
under this section.'75 Moreover, stations cannot reject commer-
cials or cancel sales of air time due to the content of an advertise-
ment.178 
Thus, licensee stations are faced with a dilemma: one provi-
sion, section 315(a), prevents them from exercising any control 
over the content of political commercials, while another provi-
sion, section 1464, makes them responsible for the broadcast of 
any indecent material. 
Since it imposes no obligation to accept any political advertis-
ing, section 315(a) seems to leave the option of refusing all politi-
cal broadcasts. If this tactic were the only alternative, however, 
in practice most political commercials would be eliminated. This 
result is incompatible with the goal of an informed electorate.177 
In fact, despite the disclaimer in section 315(a) of any affirmative 
obligation to accept political commercials, stations are now par-
tially obligated to do so. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971 amended the Communications Act of 1934 by adding a new 
ground for denial of an application for license renewal, which is 
"willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to 
permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a 
broadcast station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal 
elective office on behalf of his candidacy."178 
The best solution to this dilemma is to hold the prohibitions 
against indecency179 inapplicable to political commercials. This 
policy is justified by the canon of statutory construction prefer-
proposed act also continues the right of stations to refuse use by any candidate. Id. § 
463(b). Senator Goldwater's bill would impose a requirement to allow time for candidates 
for federal office. S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 335(0(10) (1979). 
'" Hammond for Governor Comm., 69 F.C.C.2d 946 (1978); Port Huron Broadcasting 
Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948). 
171 See Sage v. Station WHEN-TV, 62 F.C.C.2d 135 (1976); Port Huron Broadcasting 
Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948). 
177 Approaching a separate but related problem, the Supreme Court held that the Fair-
ness Doctrine did not impose an obligation on stations to accept paid editorial advertise-
ments. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
But see note 178 and accompanying text infra. 
'" Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 103(a)(2)(A), 86 Stat. 3 (1971). In addition, § 315(a) was 
changed so as not to conflict with the new requirement: "The second sentence of section 
315(a) ... is amended by inserting 'under this subsection' after 'No obligation is im-
posed.'" Id. § 103(a)(2)(B). 
The proposed revision of the act should not affect this provision since the non-
obligation construction is limited to "[t)he provisions of this section ... .'' H.R. 3333, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 463(b) (1979). 
171 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) and the ancillary provisions, 47 U.S.C. §§ 312 & 503 (1976). 
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ring the more specific of two conflicting provisions. One provision 
of the Communications Act of 1934 punishes indecency, thus giv-
ing stations an inherent right and responsibility to control the 
content of what they broadcast, which extends to all broadcast 
material, including entertainment and commercials. The non-
censorship provision of section 315(a) is narrower, however, since 
it only applies to content control of political commercials. There-
fore, section 315(a) should take precedence, rendering section 
1464 inapplicable. 
The second justification for this interpretation is the Supreme 
Court's grant of immunity from libel actions for broadcasts cov-
ered by section 315(a).180 The rationale behind this immunity 
applies as much to punishment of indecency as it does to defama-
tion. The rationale is that "the section would sanction the un-
conscionable result of permitting civil and perhaps criminal lia-
bility to be imposed for the very conduct the statute demands of 
the licensee."181 It would be equally senseless to impose adminis-
trative or criminal sanctions on broadcasters caught in this web 
after selling commercial time for political advertisements. 
The situation is more difficult, however, in cases not involving 
time purchased by or donated to the candidate for his or her 
personal use, because section 315 is limited to these cases. 182 In 
such circumstances, section 1464 applies fully. Stations are thus 
liable for the broadcast of indecent language in a news forum or 
in a commercial supporting a candidate which features someone 
other than the candidate. 
The broadcast of offensive language, including "profanity," 
would not, however, necessarily result in punishment of the licen-
see. The FCC must consider the circumstances under which the 
broadcast was made and would be unlikely to punish a station for 
broadcasing a candidate's remarks in an interview or speech. In 
pre-recorded broadcasts, stations might be required to issue 
warnings of the offensive nature of some of the comments. Com-
mercials made by persons other than the candidate may indeed 
be punished, even though the Commission has determined that 
the station is serving the public interest by allowing the commer-
cial to be aired so that the electorate is more aware of the nature 
of the campaign and the candidate. 
118 Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959); accord, Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Lamb v. Sutton, 274 F.2d 705 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830 (1960). 
111 360 U.S. at 531. 
,u Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 
909 (1951). 
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101 
It is generally impermissible, under both the Constitution and 
existing statutes, to censor or sanction broadcast political speech 
because of its indecent content. Because of the substantial inter-
est in protecting political speech, the generally-accepted notion 
that the First Amendment does not fully protect the broadcast 
media fails to justify regulation of political broadcasts. The tradi-
tional justifications for differing treatment of the broadcast and 
print media do not outweigh the degree of protection afforded 
political speech. Even if regulation were constitutionally permis-
sible, the relevant existing statutes only permit regulation in very 
narrow circumstances. Both the FCC and the stations are power-
less to control content. The constitutional guarantees protecting 
the free discussion of political issues should consequently remain 
paramount. 
-Jonathan Golomb 
